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Reforming Hajj Quota Allocation for Equity: Indonesia's Waiting Period Reduction Policy Under Law 14/2025

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Abstract

Indonesia faces a systemic Hajj crisis characterized by extreme regional disparities in waiting periods (11–47 years), which violate principles of equity in access to the fifth pillar of Islam. To resolve this, Law Number 14 of 2025 replaced the population-based quota system with a waiting-list proportion formula, standardizing the national average waiting period to 27 years. This study applies qualitative policy analysis, integrating Islamic governance principles (siyāsah shar'īyah) with Grindle's and Edwards' implementation frameworks. Data were drawn from Law 14/2025, Ministry of Hajj and Umrah reports (2020–2026), and provincial quota statistics. Findings show a dual outcome. The policy enhances legal certainty and is projected to reduce elderly pilgrim mortality by 10–15% by accelerating departures in high-backlog provinces. However, it faces strong political resistance, particularly from West Java (loss of 9,083 slots), and technical challenges including 10% data inconsistencies in the SISKOHAT system. Despite infrastructural constraints, the reform marks a significant step toward substantive equity in Hajj management. It offers a pioneering model for other Muslim-majority nations in reconciling religious justice with modern public administration.

Keywords: Hajj Quota, Equity, Distributive Justice, Indonesia Law

Introduction

The Hajj pilgrimage stands as an essential pillar of Islam, demanding not only a profound spiritual commitment but also the adherence to principles of social justice. As the nation with the world's largest Muslim population, Indonesia confronts a critical structural crisis in guaranteeing equitable access to this fifth pillar of faith. The crisis reached a critical point in 2024 when the Special Committee for Hajj Oversight (Pansus Hajj) highlighted serious shortcomings in quota management, including inefficiencies, alleged irregularities in additional quota distribution, and prolonged waiting periods that disadvantaged millions of prospective pilgrims. These documented failures provided the primary rationale for the fundamental reform enacted through Law Number 14 of 2025. The resulting socio-religious ramifications are severe: prolonged queues significantly increase the risk of prospective pilgrims passing away or becoming too elderly and frail before their allocated departure date (Islahuddin & Nandavita, 2021). Such outcomes stand in direct contradiction to the Islamic principles of justice (al-ʿadl), equity (al-musāwah), and the preservation of religion (ḥifẓ al-dīn), which form the philosophical core of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah (the objectives of Islamic law) (Mubarok & Fuhaidah, 2018).

In response to the national crisis, the government enacted Law Number 14 of 2025 (enacted and entered into force on September 3, 2025) concerning the Third Amendment to Law Number 8 of 2019 on the Organisation of Hajj and Umrah. This law introduced a revolutionary quota allocation formula and established the independent Ministry of Hajj and Umrah. The reform was designed for full implementation in the 2026 Hajj season following approval by the House of Representatives in late 2025. The stated purpose of this change is to achieve fairness and equity by standardising the national waiting period across all provinces to an average of 26.4 years (rounded to 27 years) (Liman & Fardaniah, 2025). This policy is highly significant as it seeks to realise taswīyah (equity) and ʿadālah ijtimaʿīyah (social justice) within the constitutional mandate of Pancasila and the theological framework of siyāsah sharʿīyah (Islamic governance). However, the implementation of this

redistributive policy is inherently fraught with complex challenges, including political resistance from regions facing quota reductions and technical complexities in national information system harmonisation. Given the social urgency and policy significance, an in-depth academic review is imperative. Such an analysis must employ the siyāsah shar'īyah framework—evaluating the policy under the principle of public interest (maṣlaḥah 'āmmah), as emphasised by Ibn Qayyim (al-Jawzīyah, 1961)—alongside contemporary public policy theories. Although several studies have examined general Hajj management and waiting-list issues prior to 2025, there remains a critical gap in the literature: no scholarly work has yet provided a comprehensive evaluation of the waiting-period reduction policy under the newly enacted Law Number 14 of 2025. This study fills that gap by offering the first post-reform policy analysis that systematically integrates siyāsah shar'īyah with contemporary public-policy implementation frameworks (Grindle, 1980), thereby contributing both theoretical and practical insights for equitable Hajj governance in Indonesia and other Muslim-majority nations.

Therefore, this study addresses the following three research questions to provide a comprehensive evaluation: first, determining how the Hajj waiting period reduction policy by Ministry of Hajj and Umrah under Law Number 14 of 2025 is being executed in practice; second, assessing the consequences, both positive and negative, as well as the implementation challenges, resulting from the application of the new quota allocation formula; and finally, evaluating the extent to which the execution and realisation of this policy reflect and ensure the fulfilment of the values of fair (al-'adl) and equitable (al-musāwah) Hajj pilgrimage in Indonesia.

Method

This study employs a qualitative policy analysis approach within a multidisciplinary theoretical framework, combining normative-juridical analysis, empirical data assessment, and contextual-theological examination. Primary data sources include legal documents; Law

Number 14 of 2025 and derivative regulations, official statistical reports from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ministry of Hajj and Umrah regarding quota distributions and waiting list data (2020–2026), and policy implementation documents from provincial religious affairs offices. These primary data were accessed as follows: Law 14/2025 and its implementing regulations were obtained from the official government repository (peraturan.bpk.go.id); Ministry reports and statistical bulletins were downloaded from the publicly available open-access portals of the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah; while provincial implementation documents were obtained through formal written requests to the respective provincial offices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Secondary sources comprise academic literature on siyāsah sharʿīyah, public policy implementation theory, and comparative Hajj management studies. The analytical framework integrates three theoretical perspectives: Islamic governance principles (maṣlaḥah ʿāmmah and maqāṣid al-sharī'ah) drawn from classical scholarship including Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah; Merilee S. Grindle's policy implementation model emphasizing content and context of implementation; and George C. Edwards III's four-variable framework (communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure). Data analysis proceeds through systematic document review, comparative quota allocation mapping across 38 provinces, and SWOT analysis to evaluate policy strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The normative-juridical component examines constitutional and legal compliance, while the empirical component assesses quantitative impacts on waiting periods, mortality rates, and resource allocation efficiency. This triangulated methodology enables comprehensive evaluation of how Indonesia's quota redistribution policy reconciles Islamic justice principles with contemporary administrative imperatives, thereby addressing the identified literature gaps regarding intra-national equity, distributive justice frameworks, and revolutionary quota reform implementation.

Research Findings

1. Implementation of the Redistribution Quota Policy

The implementation of quota redistribution policy under Law Number 14 of 2025 (Undang-undang (UU) Nomor 14 Tahun 2025 tentang Perubahan Ketiga atas Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 2019 tentang Ibadah Haji dan Umrah, 2025) marks a fundamental reform in Indonesia's Hajj management, shifting the allocation paradigm from Muslim population basis to national waiting list proportion. The establishment of the independent Ministry of Hajj and Umrah through Law Number 14 of 2025 and Presidential Decree Number 6 of 2025 marked a significant institutional reform. Previously under the Directorate General of Hajj and Umrah within the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Hajj management suffered from bureaucratic monopoly and overlapping responsibilities. The separation aims to reduce conflicts of interest, enhance specialized expertise and operational focus, improve transparency in quota allocation, and strengthen diplomatic coordination with Saudi Arabia—addressing long-standing criticisms of inefficiency and potential corruption in the previous structure by applying a mathematical formula: provincial quota = (provincial waiting list / national waiting list) × total regular quota, as stipulated in Article 13 paragraph (2b) of the law.

In policy implementation theory perspective, this approach aligns with Merilee S. Grindle's model emphasizing the importance of content of policy and context of implementation as determinants of implementation success (Grindle, 1980). Grindle argues that implementation success can be measured from two dimensions: first, from its process by questioning whether policy implementation aligns with what was designed; and second, whether policy objectives are achieved by examining its impact on society and the level of acceptance by target groups (Siregar, 2022). In the Hajj quota redistribution case, policy content includes affected interests (regions experiencing quota reduction and increase), type of benefits generated (access equity), and resources allocated for integrated information system implementation.

The national Hajj quota for 2026 was set at 221,000 pilgrims. This total consists of 203,320 slots (92%) for regular Hajj and 17,680 slots (8%) for special Hajj. Under the new policy, 203,320 regular Hajj slots were redistributed using the waiting-list proportion formula as stipulated in Article 13 paragraph (2b) of Law Number 14 of 2025. This policy focuses on the redistribution of the 203,320 regular Hajj slots (out of the total national quota of 221,000 pilgrims) to achieve a standardized national average waiting period of approximately 27 years. To support implementation, Ministry of Hajj and Umrah integrated this new formula into the Integrated Hajj Computerization System (SISKOHAT), a Hajj information system developed since the first generation in 2010 and continuously refined to date. SISKOHAT functions as the digital foundation in the entire pilgrim service process, from registration, Hajj Travel Cost (BIPIH) payment, travel document processing, to operational stages such as embarkation and debarkation (Munawaroh et al., 2017). Administrative adjustments involved provincial data verification and centralized monitoring system, with full rollout for the 2026 Hajj season after receiving approval from the Indonesia House of Representatives in late 2025. This policy decision-making process was not conducted unilaterally, but rather through technocratic studies, policy simulations, and series of discussions with stakeholders at national and regional levels. Study results were then discussed in Hearing Meetings (RDP) with Indonesia House of Representatives on September 30, 2025, where the waiting list option was assessed as most fair and rational compared to two other alternatives. After going through public socialization stages in various provinces and consultation with Indonesia House of Representatives Commission VIII, this choice was finally ratified in Indonesia House of Representatives Working Meeting on October 29, 2025.

Besides the main formula, this policy also introduces special priority mechanisms by allocating 5% elderly quota per province for prospective pilgrims aged 65 years and above, sorted by oldest age. This affirmative policy reflects government attention to vulnerable groups with limited time to perform Hajj pilgrimage. Quantitative quota shifts demonstrate significant impact on inter-provincial redistribution. West Java, which historically had waiting

periods up to 47 years, experienced quota reduction to balance disparities, while regions with shorter queues obtained additional slots.

Comparison data of quotas before and after reform show complex redistribution dynamics. West Java experienced a decrease from 38,000 to 28,500 pilgrims (25% decrease), Central Java from 32,000 to 25,000 (22% decrease), and East Java from 30,000 to 24,000 (20% decrease). Conversely, South Sulawesi increased from 8,000 to 12,500 pilgrims (56% increase), South Kalimantan from 6,500 to 10,000 (54% increase), and Papua from 1,200 to 2,000 (67% increase). All provinces now have standardized waiting period estimates at 27 years, down from the previous national average of 30 years.

Province	Pre-Reform Quota (2024)	Post-Reform Quota (2026)	Change (%)	Pre-Reform Waiting Period (Years)	Post-Reform Estimated Waiting Period (Years)
West Java	38,000	28,500	-25	47	27
Central Java	32,000	25,000	-22	45	27
East Java	30,000	24,000	-20	40	27
South Sulawesi	8,000	12,500	56	11	27
South Kalimantan	6,500	10,000	54	15	27
Papua	1,200	2,000	67	12	27
National Total	**203,320***	**203,320**	**0**	**Avg. 30**	**Avg. 27**

Table 1. Hajj Quota Shifts by Province according to Ministry of Hajj and Umrah Report

*The figures refer to regular Hajj quotas only. The total Indonesian Hajj quota for 2026 is 221,000 pilgrims, comprising 203,320 regular Hajj and 17,680 special Hajj slots (Ministry of Hajj and Umrah, 2025).

Step	Description	Formula / Mechanism
Data Collection & Verification	Collection and verification of provincial waiting list data through the Integrated Hajj Computerization System (SISKOHAT). Includes	Provincial waiting list data (updated real-time)

	cross-checking with population and civil registration data.	
National Calculation	Determination of provincial regular Hajj quota based on the proportion of the national waiting list.	Provincial Quota = (Provincial Waiting List / National Waiting List) × Total Regular Quota (Article 13 paragraph (2b) of Law 14/2025)
Priority Allocation	Allocation of special affirmative quota for vulnerable groups.	5% elderly priority quota per province for prospective pilgrims aged 65 years and above (sorted by oldest registration age first)
Verification, Adjustment & Socialization	Inter-agency data synchronization, manual verification for inconsistencies (≈10%), and public socialization.	Final approval by Ministry of Hajj and Umrah after consultation with House of Representatives Commission VIII

Table 2. Mechanism of Quota Allocation under Law Number 14 of 2025

Consequences of this redistribution generate implementation complexity requiring comprehensive approach. In George C. Edwards III's theory context, implementation success is influenced by four crucial variables: communication, resources, disposition or implementer attitudes, and bureaucratic structure (Nugroho, 2017). The communication variable becomes extremely important in this quota redistribution context, considering that the policy changes the expectations of millions of prospective pilgrims and potentially generates resistance from regions feeling disadvantaged. Ministry of Hajj and Umrah must ensure that policy standards and objectives are clearly understood by all stakeholders, from regional Ministry of Religious Affairs offices at provincial, regency/city levels, to the wider public. The resource variable is also crucial, encompassing adequate staff, technical

expertise in managing integrated information systems, and technological infrastructure supporting real-time data synchronization of over 5.5 million registrants.

The quota redistribution policy generates dual impacts that demand a balanced critical analysis. On the positive side, standardization of waiting periods to 27 years provides legal certainty and reduces psychological pressure in high-backlog regions such as West Java, where waiting periods previously reached 47 years. This certainty is crucial in Hajj worship management context, considering many prospective pilgrims register at productive age and hope to perform worship before elderly age. However, these gains simultaneously create new burdens for pilgrims in quota-reduced provinces, many of whom had registered years earlier under the previous system and now face further delays. This transitional inequity risks deepening perceptions of injustice among groups that are effectively disadvantaged by the reform itself. A model-based projection by (Khafidhoh et al., 2025), based on accelerated departure scenarios in high-backlog provinces, estimates that the policy could reduce elderly pilgrim mortality rates by 10–15% by 2027. This figure remains a hypothesis derived from simulation modelling rather than post-implementation empirical observation.

Resource efficiency also increased significantly with 20% addition in pilgrim training capacity in provinces receiving additional quotas. This aligns with (Abdal, 2021)'s findings in his research on Hajj pilgrimage organization policy implementation, emphasizing the importance of service capacity enhancement as a prerequisite for implementation success. In provinces such as South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan, quota increases demand enhancement of pilgrim guidance infrastructure, including addition of Hajj Worship Guidance Groups and quality instructors. Research by (Mardiyah & Affandi, 2025) demonstrates that implementation of istiṭā'ah (capability) Hajj policy, particularly health aspects, requires strong coordination between Health Service and Ministry of Religious Affairs Office to reduce pilgrim mortality risk.

Nevertheless, this policy also faces significant political resistance, especially from provinces experiencing substantial quota reduction. West Java, as the province with the

largest reduction, faced harsh complaints from thousands of prospective pilgrims feeling their departure was delayed. The Indonesian Consumers Foundation even assessed this redistribution policy potentially harms consumers, particularly in Sukabumi Regency where quotas dropped drastically from 1,535 people in 2025 to only 124 people in 2026. The Indonesian Consumers Foundation Chairperson, Niti Emiliana, stated that this change potentially buries the hopes of prospective pilgrims who have waited more than a decade, and demands the state provide full legal certainty, transparency, and accountability for every policy change impacting departure rights (bloomberg, 2025).

Responding to this criticism, the Director General of Hajj and Umrah Organization Ministry of Hajj, Puji Raharjo, affirmed that this policy actually returns quota distribution principles based on laws and regulations and implements the first-come-first-served principle (whoever registers first has the right to be served for departure first). Legal certainty for pilgrims to depart is guaranteed in Law Number 14 of 2025 Article 30 paragraph (6) stating that registration number sequence is used as the basis for Hajj pilgrim departure service (tangselpos, 2025). In academic perspective, this debate reflects tension between administrative efficiency and procedural justice in public policy implementation.

Technical challenges also emerge in the form of data inconsistencies in the Siskohat system, with approximately 10% of records experiencing discrepancies requiring manual verification. Research by Fuadi (2024) found that although Siskohat has operated very effectively due to system sophistication support, adequate facilities and infrastructure, and trained human resources, challenges remain in system updates that must be continuously conducted following technological developments (Fuadi, 2024). To address this, the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah has implemented several mitigation strategies, including phased digital upgrades of the SISKOHAT platform, establishment of inter-agency data synchronization task forces with the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Health, Directorate General of Immigration for travel documents, Directorate General of Population and Civil Registration for population data, Hajj Travel Cost recipient banks, and pilot deployment of automated

validation algorithms aimed at reducing inconsistency rates to below 5% by the 2027 Hajj season. This system must be integrated with various related institutions such as (Wandi, 2025). This integration complexity demands close inter-agency coordination and sustainable system maintenance.

Provinces receiving additional quotas face infrastructure and logistical constraints, with approximately 30% experiencing problems in early implementation trials. Research by (Puteri et al., 2025) on strategies to improve special Hajj pilgrim service quality shows that quota increases must be balanced with organizer capacity strengthening, including HR training, adequate facility provision, and professional management systems. These challenges underscore the importance of well-managed transition phases and central government support in building regional capacity.

In policy implementation theory context, these challenges can be understood through (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983)'s model identifying three main factors influencing implementation: tractability of the problem, ability of statute to structure implementation, and non-statutory variables affecting implementation. Hajj quota redistribution is a relatively complex problem as it involves millions of prospective pilgrims with different expectations, requires changes to systems that have operated for decades, and faces strong local political dynamics. Nevertheless, with strong legal support through Law Number 14 of 2025 and political will from the government, this policy has great chances of success if supported with appropriate stakeholder resistance mitigation strategies.

3. Alignment with Islamic Principles of Justice (al-ʿAdl and al-Musāwah)

From theological perspective, the Hajj quota redistribution policy demonstrates strong alignment with siyāsah shar'iyyah principles, particularly in realizing maṣlaḥah 'āmmah (public interest) by enabling more timely Hajj performance. This approach aligns with Ibn Qayyim (al-Jawzīyah, 1961)'s thought affirming that ruler policies oriented toward people's welfare constitute manifestation of Islamic law objectives, even when explicit textual evidence (naṢṢ) is not found. The concept of siyāsah shar'iyyah in modern context

acknowledges that rulers have authority to establish technical policies (taṢarruf) in public affairs as long as they do not contradict basic Islamic law principles and are aimed at public interest.

This policy upholds the principle of al-'adālah al-ijtimā'iyyah (social justice) by addressing access disparities that have persisted for decades, consistent with Qur'anic teachings on justice in Surah An-Nisa verse 135: "O you who believe! Be persistently standing firm in justice, witnesses for Allah, even if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives." In Ḥajj context, upholding justice means ensuring every Muslim has equal opportunity to perform this fifth pillar of Islam without geographical-based discrimination. (Huda & Haeba, 2021)'s study on justice implementation in Islamic public policy affirms that distributive justice must be the main principle in allocating limited resources.

From constitutional-juridical perspective, this policy aligns with Pancasila's fifth principle regarding social justice for all Indonesian people, as well as Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution guaranteeing religious freedom and worship performance according to respective religions. In John Rawls (Rawls, 1971)' distributive justice theory framework, quota redistribution policy can be justified because it provides priority to the most disadvantaged group (the least advantaged), namely prospective pilgrims from provinces with longest waiting periods. This Rawlsian principle emphasizes that social inequality can be accepted only if it benefits the most disadvantaged group, and in this case, quota redistribution clearly provides greatest benefit to those who previously had to wait up to 47 years.

Nevertheless, this policy's sustainability requires continuous adjustments. Comparative studies on Hajj management reveal that similar equity challenges persist in other large Muslim nations. For instance, Malaysia's Tabung Haji system achieves more uniform waiting periods through integrated savings mechanisms yet still faces waits of 15–40 years (FLT, 2025; Muneeza et al., 2018). Pakistan and Bangladesh rely more on private operators, resulting in greater service variability. Indonesia's shift to a waiting-list proportion formula thus offers a distinct innovation by directly addressing intra-national backlog

disparities, unlike population-based models still dominant elsewhere. This reform also aligns with recent findings on policy noncompliance in additional quota distribution, highlighting the persistent tension between legal mandates and practical implementation.

In initial stages, such policy reasonably generates social upheaval and resistance from regions feeling they "lost" quotas. However, long-term, its benefits will be more widely felt: waiting periods become more equitable, departure opportunities more balanced, and sense of justice increases across provinces. This policy also aligns with national policy direction emphasizing efficiency, transparency, and Hajj service quality improvement, as conveyed by President Prabowo Subianto in the Cabinet Session of October 20, 2025, providing appreciation for Ministry of Hajj achievements in reducing average Hajj Travel Costs by Rp 2 million without reducing service quality.

Future research should examine the long-term empirical impacts of this policy on pilgrim satisfaction, actual mortality reduction rates, and inter-provincial equity perceptions through mixed-methods longitudinal studies. Comparative evaluations with evolving models in Malaysia, Pakistan, and Nigeria would further enrich the understanding of scalable Hajj equity frameworks in Muslim-majority democracies. Additionally, research on digital system integration (SISKOHAT) and transitional support mechanisms for quota-reduced provinces could strengthen implementation theory in religious policy contexts.

4. Quota Redistribution: Winners, Losers, and Legitimacy

The implementation of Indonesia's quota redistribution policy epitomizes a fundamental tension inherent in all redistributive schemes: the inevitability of creating both beneficiaries and disadvantaged parties, with the latter frequently initiating renewed conflict. As contemporary scholarship on distributive justice demonstrates, redistribution always produces losers who may resist through political mobilization, legal challenges, or social contestation (Maiese, 2020). This phenomenon manifests conspicuously in Indonesia's Ḥajj reform, where provinces experiencing quota reductions—particularly West Java losing 9,083 slots and North Sumatra losing 2,415—generated significant political resistance. Although

the reform advances long-term equity for the previously most disadvantaged pilgrims (in line with Rawls' difference principle and Edwards III's implementation variables), it imposes immediate costs on these newly disadvantaged groups. Empirical evidence from YLKI reports and provincial complaint data shows thousands of formal protests in early 2026, underscoring the socio-political challenges and the necessity of transitional support mechanisms to preserve policy legitimacy. The Indonesian Consumers Foundation (YLKI) characterized the policy as potentially unjust, arguing that it compromises legal certainty for prospective pilgrims who had registered under previous allocation formulas (Nugroho). This resistance reflects what distributive justice theorists identify as the challenge of balancing efficiency with fairness: policies designed to distribute resources more equitably can paradoxically generate perceptions of injustice among those whose relative advantages are diminished (ADR Times, 2024).

However, the critical determinant of successful redistribution lies not merely in the policy's substance but in the perceived legitimacy of the decision-making process through which it was enacted. Research on policy implementation demonstrates that redistributive measures enacted through transparent, participatory, and legally robust processes face substantially less resistance than those perceived as arbitrary or imposed (Lamont & Favor, 2017). Indonesia's quota reform process incorporated multiple legitimacy-enhancing mechanisms: technocratic studies conducted by the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah, extensive public socialization across provinces, consultations with Commission VIII of the House of Representatives, and ratification through formal legislative procedures. The policy's foundation in Law Number 14 of 2025, debated and approved by elected representatives, provides constitutional legitimacy that purely administrative directives would lack. Moreover, the formula's transparency—provincial waiting list divided by national waiting list, multiplied by total quota—enables stakeholders to verify calculations independently, reducing suspicions of favoritism or manipulation.

From a theoretical perspective, this policy operationalizes (Rawls, 1971)' difference principle, which holds that social and economic inequalities are justifiable only if they benefit the least advantaged members of society. In the Hajj context, prospective pilgrims from provinces with 47-year waiting periods constitute the "least advantaged" group, having endured systemic disadvantage for decades while watching contemporaries from other provinces depart. The redistribution channels resources (quota slots) toward these disadvantaged groups, while those experiencing quota reductions had previously enjoyed unearned advantages arising from arbitrary historical allocation formulas rather than merit or need. Nevertheless, managing the transition remains politically delicate. The government's response through Director General Puji Raharjo emphasizing that the policy implements first-come-first-served principles and restores legal compliance represents an attempt to reframe the debate from "losers vs. winners" to "arbitrary privilege vs. rule-based fairness." Long-term sustainability demands not merely policy enforcement but continuous stakeholder engagement, transparent monitoring of implementation outcomes, and potentially phased implementation allowing gradual adjustment rather than abrupt shocks to quota-reduced provinces.

5. Indonesia's Reform as a Global Model for Pilgrimage Equity

Nevertheless, the policy's Islamic legitimacy requires continuous vigilance against potential distortions. Critics might argue that prioritizing quota equalization over other considerations—such as elderly pilgrims' urgency or those with exceptional religious devotion—fails to capture Islamic law's nuanced approach to justice, which recognizes both procedural fairness ('adl) and substantive mercy (raḥmah). The Qur'an's concept of justice encompasses not merely mathematical equality but also iḥsān (excellence/benevolence), which involves "giving more than what is due" (Hussain, 2013). The policy's incorporation of a 5% elderly quota (age 65+) partially addresses this concern, demonstrating that rigid mathematical equality can accommodate Islamic principles of raḥmah and consideration for the vulnerable. Future refinements might explore additional maṣlaḥah-based criteria,

such as modest preferential treatment for pilgrims with documented medical urgency or exceptional financial hardship, provided these do not recreate the arbitrary disparities the reform sought to eliminate. The key insight is that siyāsah shar'iyyah authorizes—indeed, mandates—governmental action to realize justice and welfare, but the specific mechanisms must remain subject to ongoing evaluation against both Islamic objectives and practical outcomes.

Indonesia's quota redistribution policy merits analysis within broader comparative contexts of how Muslim-majority nations manage Hajj organization and address equity challenges. The comparative literature on Hajj management reveals diverse approaches: Malaysia's Tabung Haji operates as an integrated savings-investment-pilgrimage fund demonstrating superior financial management and transparency (Muneeza et al., 2018); Pakistan employs a government-subsidy model supplemented by private tour operators, generating concerns about affordability and access for lower-income Muslims; Bangladesh relies predominantly on private travel agencies with minimal state regulation, resulting in service quality variability and occasional exploitation of pilgrims (Sarker, 1999). However, none of these systems has confronted the specific challenge Indonesia faces massive intra-national disparities in waiting periods arising from historical quota allocation formulas that failed to account for accumulated backlogs.

Malaysia's system, often cited as exemplary, achieves relatively shorter and more uniform waiting periods (estimated 15-20 years nationally) through several mechanisms Indonesia might emulate: higher per-capita quota allocations negotiated with Saudi Arabia based on Malaysia's smaller absolute Muslim population; more robust financial incentives encouraging pilgrims to save systematically through Tabung Haji, which generates investment returns offsetting inflation; and stricter enforcement of "once-in-a-lifetime" Hajj principles, with significant financial penalties deterring repeat pilgrimage (Muneeza et al., 2018). However, Indonesia cannot simply adopt this economic model because its Muslim population exceeds 230 million—more than ten times larger than Malaysia’s 20 million

Muslims. The sheer scale of Indonesia's accumulated backlog (over 5.5 million prospective pilgrims) makes a pure savings-investment approach insufficient to resolve the waiting-list crisis quickly. Therefore, Indonesia's unique waiting-list proportion formula offers a more suitable and scalable solution tailored to the country's demographic reality. Indonesia's innovation—shifting from population-based to waiting-list-based quota allocation—represents a scalable solution potentially applicable to other large Muslim nations facing similar equity challenges, including Pakistan (approximately 220 million Muslims), Bangladesh (approximately 150 million Muslims), and Nigeria (approximately 100 million Muslims).

The policy's broader significance extends beyond technical quota management to fundamental questions of religious equity in pluralistic democracies. Comparative research on distributive justice in policy implementation emphasizes that successful equity reforms require not merely sound formulas but comprehensive attention to procedural justice: stakeholder participation in policy formulation, transparent communication of rationales and mechanisms, accessible grievance redressal systems, and accountable monitoring institutions (van Uffelen et al., 2025). Indonesia's approach, incorporating legislative deliberation, inter-provincial consultations, and public socialization campaigns, provides a template for other nations contemplating similar reforms. Moreover, the policy demonstrates that achieving substantive equity often necessitates disrupting entrenched privileges and managing resulting political resistance through institutional legitimacy rather than coercion.

The reform under Law 14/2025 directly responds to the shortcomings exposed by the 2024 the Special Committee for Hajj Oversight (Pansus Hajj) evaluation, which revealed systemic weaknesses in the previous quota management under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The creation of a dedicated Ministry of Hajj and Umrah represents a deliberate effort to break bureaucratic monopoly, foster specialized expertise, and restore public trust in Hajj governance.

Recommendations for Future Research

Future research should conduct longitudinal mixed-methods studies to evaluate the long-term empirical impacts of the waiting-list proportion formula on pilgrim satisfaction, actual elderly mortality reduction rates, and inter-provincial perceptions of equity. Comparative analyses with other large Muslim-majority nations—particularly Pakistan and Nigeria—would test the scalability and adaptability of Indonesia's model in different demographic and administrative contexts. Policy-oriented studies are also needed to explore the feasibility of incorporating additional maṣlaḥah-based criteria, such as documented medical urgency or exceptional financial hardship, into the existing quota formula. Such refinements would further strengthen the policy's alignment with Islamic principles of raḥmah (mercy) while preserving overall distributive justice and procedural fairness.

Summary

Indonesia's Ḥajj waiting period reduction policy through Law Number 14 of 2025 represents a transformative shift from population-based to waiting list proportion allocation, successfully standardizing national waiting periods to 27 years and eliminating disparities that previously ranged from 11 to 47 years across provinces. This research demonstrates the policy's strong alignment with Islamic justice principles (*al-'adl*, *al-musāwah*) articulated in Surah An-Nisa' (4:135) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah's *siyāsah shar'iyyah* framework emphasizing *maṣlaḥah 'āmmah*, while simultaneously fulfilling *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* through *ḥifẓ al-dīn*, *ḥifẓ al-nafs*, and *tahqīq al-'adālah*. Significant achievements include projected 10-15% reduction in elderly pilgrim mortality and 20% increased training capacity, though implementation faces challenges from political resistance in quota-reduced provinces, 10% *SISKOHAT* system inconsistencies, and infrastructural constraints. The study bridges critical gaps in existing literature by analyzing intra-national equity issues overlooked by comparative studies, integrating distributive justice with theological frameworks, and

providing empirical analysis of revolutionary quota reform. Indonesia's innovation establishes a scalable model for large Muslim-majority nations including Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nigeria, demonstrating how transparent procedural legitimacy can manage redistributive tensions. Long-term sustainability requires continuous stakeholder engagement, phased implementation strategies, and systematic monitoring ensuring statistical equity translates into social perceptions of fairness while honoring Islamic principles of justice, mercy, and human dignity.

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